

ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN PROTECTING AND PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIPOLAR WORLD PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Though the present world power is characterized as a multipolar, the exact flavour and practice are neither well understood nor consistently observed. Moreover, in the absence of a genuine balance of power in a multipolar order, human rights are often compromised, as powerful states prioritize self-interest over universal values. This has a result to frequent violations of human rights. However, formal organizations created by agreements among sovereign states to address shared challenges and pursue common goals on a global scale human right. This study addresses a significant gap in the existing literature by exploring how these institutions operate within a multipolar global framework, where competing national interests, unequal power relations, and varying cultural perspectives often outweigh normative commitments to human rights. Prior studies have primarily concentrated on institutional performance within a Western-centric liberal order, leaving a gap in understanding their effectiveness and adaptability in a fragmented geopolitical landscape. The main aim of this research is to assess whether international institutions can continue to act as effective defenders of human rights in light of global power diffusion, and to what extent they have succeeded or failed in this role. Employing a doctrinal approach grounded in secondary data, this research explores institutional behaviour through case studies including Yemen, Myanmar, Bangladesh and others, revealing a pattern of both stagnation and potential. Findings show that institutional efforts are frequently obstructed by political deadlocks, such as the veto power held by the UN Security Council and the selective engagement of states with entities such as the International Criminal Court. This study also uncovers new opportunities, including the concept of an "Accountability Economy," in which nations enhance their human rights standards not just out of duty but to gain economic advantages and improve their international reputation. The research emphasizes how trade incentives, reputation-related pressures, and regional interpretations of human rights can provide alternative methods to encourage adherence.

Keywords: Human Rights, International Institutions, Multipolarity, Accountability Economy.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The global system has always focused on defending and promoting human rights, international institutions play a key role in this effort (Kim, D. 2013, p. 517). This system refers a multipolar world structure with new political and economics emerged power. This geopolitical change raise questions on fairness and success of human rights institutions and their efforts as well as challenges Western-led values. Crises in Yemen, Afghanistan, Myanmar and Ethiopia shows how International Institutions are facing challenges to stop

human rights violation. Political rivalries, clashing goals and division have navigating challenges on the effectiveness of these institutions for protecting human rights. As a result, vulnerable community haven't got the protection they seek for. Furthermore, the one-size-fits-all approach frequently associated with Western values is being challenged by growing powers like China, Russia, and countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who are increasingly advocating for regional interpretations of human rights (McCrudden, C. 2020).

As the research is for justifying the effectiveness of international institutions for protection of human rights in multipolar world, evolving interplay between global institutions, the realities of a multipolar world and the processes that govern human rights enforcement is our core concern of study. International Institutions of human rights have prospects and difficulties on operating their functionalities.

The primary focus of this research is on prospects and realities of international institutions in protecting human rights with its failure on state application of international law harmoniously. It's harsh truth that international organisations and institutions are playing unavoidable role on protecting human rights all over the world, though the organisations and their de facto controlling bodies have particular political ideologies likely the United Nations, the European Union etc. Those organisational charters, bills, treaties, declarations, protocols etc are playing role as important source of human rights protection standards. But these sources are frequently serving the interest of super power as the reason of geopolitical dynamics and hegemonic ideology (Kim, 2013; Menegazzi, 2020). Generally international Framework for protecting human rights uphold its motion, which is shaped by both external and internal factors. Externally, geopolitical competition, economic race and regional interpretations of human rights make challenges on cooperative and collective response of international institutions in protecting human rights (Piccone, 2016; Wilson, 2016). Internally, internationally recognised law enforcing authority, state limitations on economic capacity and variability of mandate on passing international documents challenges the enforcement of human rights (Salaini, 112-113, 2023). The Idea of accountability economy for enhancing record of human rights for validating economic and political legitimacy in international stage also discussed. (Amnesty International, 2019).

1.2 Methodology

The research is conducted by doctrinal and pure legal research approach. So, this approach entails, a careful reading and comparison of various documents to identify vagueness, expose inconsistencies, discover discrepancies and exercise the legal analysis. In this study attention is given to the failures of international institutions in protecting human rights. Furthermore, a descriptive method was utilized to analyse present condition of human rights violations worldwide. The methodology also critically evaluates existing literature from legal and institutional perspective. Additionally, scholarly views and opinions expressed in text books, journals, newspapers have been included to reach the objective of the study.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

International institutions play a key role in protecting human rights in a changing world (Ivanytskyi, A. 2024, p. 54). Crises in Yemen, Afghanistan, Myanmar and Ethiopia indicate incompetence of international organizations in protecting human rights, which reflecting the immense challenges of their mandate. (Tronc, E. 2018, p. 54). Political and strategic interests of powerful states often take precedence over humanitarian needs, make it more defaults for global and regional institutions to upholds human rights (Narang, N. 2016, p. 191). For example, the UN Security Council often fails to address how human rights are violated by member countries, because of the protection of super powers' interest (Weerdesteijn, M. 2016, p. 76). This self-driven incapacity of international organisations, compounded by influence of superpowers in framing regulations, create a vital deadlock on global response regarding human rights. National human rights institutions apply global standards by monitoring cases, reviewing laws and linking international and local systems (Carver, R. 2010, p. 2). However international institutions face significant limitations including legal restrictions, state control, lack of political will and limited resources.

To improve the implications of international organizations and ensure contextually appropriate regulatory outcomes, it is imperative to shift from the prevailing generalized objective frameworks toward a more circumstantial and subjective approach. The persistent shortcomings of the existing model underscore the urgent need for national institutions to adopt a more collaborative and integrated stance within the international regulatory landscape.

While human rights courts serve as critical mechanisms for monitoring violations and supporting victims, their limited enforcement power significantly undermines their effectiveness in compelling state compliance (Salainti, Y., 2023, p. 112). Although these institutions play a vital role in naming and shaming perpetrators and offering a platform for redress, they ultimately lack the coercive authority to obligate states to modify behavior or implement reforms (Salainti, Y., 2023, p. 113). This structural weakness accentuates the necessity of early, preventive engagement to deter egregious human rights abuses before they escalate beyond institutional control.

In this context, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged as significant actors in the human rights landscape, particularly in instances where state mechanisms are either complicit in abuses or altogether absent (Nelson, P. et al., 2007, p. 195). NGOs contribute substantially to the protection and promotion of rights by filling institutional voids, mobilizing international attention and empowering affected individuals and communities to assert their entitlements (Tuijl, P., 1999, p. 493). However, the emergence of a multipolar global order has complicated their efficacy. The strategic interests and competing ideologies of dominant state actors increasingly shape the operational space available to civil society organizations, thereby curtailing the global influence of NGOs and diminishing their capacity to act autonomously in defence of human rights (Heiss, A., & Kelley, J., 2017, p. 734).

Many countries do not fully comply human rights agreements, which weakens global protections (Sun, Q. 2023, p. 494). Also, rising powers in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America challenge Western human rights norms (Menegazzi, S. 2020, p. 146). They argue for regional approaches that fit their cultural and political views (Menegazzi, S. 2020, p. 147).

History shows how international institutions help to promote human rights. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) supported Namibia's independence by ensuring fair elections. This became a model for including human rights monitoring in peacekeeping (United Nations, n.d., UNTAG – Namibia).

Later UN missions in El Salvador, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique followed this approach, using civilian, police and military teams to restore order (Bertram, E. 1995, p. 416). As a result, the world trying to convert their approach for protecting human rights from 'Supervising conflicts' by the key powers to 'internal conflict solving strategy' in their own way.

On contrary, international institutions have the potential to protect human rights in multipolar world. In historic precedents international institutions have played vital role in protecting and promoting human rights in different parts of the glob at the time of conflict and even after vulnerabilities.

As a precedent United Nations Transitions Assistance Group (UNTAG) is a real time example for us, played remarkable role to transit country from colonial rule to sovereign independence state in 1980s. UNTAG not only limited to sovereign independent state and election procedure but also observe border human rights agenda such as: monitoring abuses, political inclusiveness, democratic atmosphere etc. Which led UN operation for protecting human rights as successful mission (United Nations, n.d., *UNTAG – Namibia*). As the way, UN operate mission at El Salvador, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique for addressing conflicts (Bertram, E., 1995, p. 416).

These missions reflected a marked evolution in peacekeeping doctrine: the emphasis shifted from traditional inter-state conflict mediation to the resolution of intra-state conflicts, with explicit recognition of the centrality of human rights in securing lasting peace and justice.

As such, these interventions helped reframe international peacekeeping as a mechanism not only for halting violence but also for rebuilding societies on the foundation of human dignity, rule of law, and participatory governance.

Studies show that human rights are not always effectively integrated into development work. The inconsistent application of human rights strategies by UN agencies has resulted in weak coordination.

While existing literature recognise these loopholes, it has not sufficiently examined how international organizations and institutions are failing to protect human rights within the realities of a multipolar world. This gap highlights the need for further research into the effectiveness and adaptability of these institutions under shifting global power dynamics.

3. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

3.1 Challenges in a Multipolar World

The rise of a multipolar world makes it harder to protect and promote human rights. Power is now spread across many countries with different political systems, values, and interests. This is a big change from the post-Cold War era when Western democracies shaped global human rights norms. Because of this, it's tougher to agree on human rights issues. A major challenge is the clash between Western human rights ideals and the priorities of rising powers (Piccone, T. 2016). Western countries focus on personal freedom, free speech, and universal rights (Bell, D., & Jayasuriya, K. 1995, p. 1). In contrast, countries like China and Russia value state sovereignty, cultural traditions, and non-interference (Wilson, J. L. 2016, p. 139). For example, China's human rights policy centers on economic growth and collective welfare over political freedom (Subedi, S. 2015, p. 138). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) reflects this, as it prioritizes trade over human rights. Similarly, Russia often backs authoritarian regimes, claiming to defend traditional values while resisting Western liberalism (Horváth, R. 2016, p. 869). These differences weaken the idea of universal human rights, as global powers fail to agree on common standards.




Figure: Core Tensions in the Human Rights Landscape of a Multipolar Order

3.2 Examples of Disagreements

The crises in Yemen and Myanmar show how hard it is to reach international agreement on human rights (Ismail, A., & Dolan-Evans, E., 2017, September 12). Yemen's war has caused mass starvation, displacement, and civilian deaths (United Nations, 2023). Yet, the UN Security Council (UNSC) remains stuck. Russia and China often block resolutions, citing sovereignty, while Western countries stress human rights violations (Lundgren, M., & Klamberg, M. 2022). In Myanmar, the military's crackdown on the Rohingya has been

called ethnic cleansing. But China's support for Myanmar prevents the UNSC from holding the junta accountable (Strangio, S. 2021). China's strategic interests, like access to the Indian Ocean, outweigh human rights concerns. *Institutional Weaknesses*: Global organizations like the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC) struggle in a multipolar world. The UNSC's veto power often leads to deadlock (Kasim, A., et al., 2024, p. 4). This makes it hard to address crises in places like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar. The ICC also faces limits, as major powers like the US, China, and Russia haven't joined. Accusations of bias, especially against African leaders, further hurt the ICC's reputation (Niang, M. 2017, p. 515). Non-State Actors and Populist Movements have the similar influence. Large companies add more complexity to human rights issues. In regions with weak laws, they may exploit workers and communities. Fixing these needs global cooperation, which is tough in a divided world. Meanwhile, populist leaders in countries like Brazil, India, and Hungary use nationalism to silence dissent and target minorities. These actions weaken global human rights norms and make it harder for institutions to respond without breaching national sovereignty.

This divided landscape shows the big challenges in protecting human rights today. Without stronger global cooperation, political and economic interests will keep pushing human rights to the side.

3.3 Opportunities for an "Accountability Economy":

In the multipolar world, countries compete for influence, trade, and standing (Chernysheva, A. 2020). This competition can help grow and protect human rights. As nations work in a connected world, they often improve their human rights records. They do this to keep a good image and gain economic benefits (Apergis, N., & Cooray, A. 2019).

This creates an "Accountability Economy." In this system, respecting human rights helps countries gain economic and political advantages. One example is the EU's GSP+ program. It gives trade benefits to countries that follow rules on human rights, labor rights, and the environment. Countries like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have gained from this. For instance, after the Rana Plaza disaster, Bangladesh improved labor laws and factory safety (International Labour Organization, 2023).

These changes show how economic incentives can lead to better human rights practices. History also shows how this works. The global anti-apartheid movement helped end apartheid in South Africa (Anti-Apartheid Movement, n.d.). Sanctions and boycotts played a big role. The Kimberley Process is another example. It stops conflict diamonds from funding violence. Countries that don't meet its standards lose access to global markets. This gives them a financial reason to comply.

Hosting big events like the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup can also push for reform. Countries under global scrutiny often make changes to avoid criticism. For example, before the 2022 World Cup, Qatar improved labor conditions for migrant workers (Amnesty International, 2019).

However, the Accountability Economy has challenges. Some governments make small changes just to get economic benefits. They may not make real, lasting improvements. Powerful countries might also use human rights as a tool to control weaker nations. At the same time, they may ignore their own violations. Still, the link between human rights and economic interests offers a chance for progress. By strengthening global norms and using competition, international groups and civil society can push countries to be more accountable. Respecting human rights is not just the right thing to do, it's also key to sustainable development and global legitimacy.

3.4 Interplay between Institutions and Multipolarity

Organizations such as the United Nations (UN), regional bodies like the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as global non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are increasingly struggling to forge consensus and promote a unified human rights agenda as global authority becomes more distributed. The emergence of varying priorities and fragmented interests due to multipolarity often results in institutional impasses or selective compliance with international standards (Ikenberry, 2018).

The United Nation Security Council is the best example of biasness in enforcing human rights regardless of considering region, culture, geography, religion and economics condition of the UN member country. Even Sometime veto empowered country take side off human rights violator to block resolutions that they perceive as conflicting with their national interests, frequently causing stalemates (Kassim et al., 2024).

Personal interest-based coalitions of veto holding members bar to do collective action, as an example we refer UN Security Council Setting regarding conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Myanmar and Palestine (Lundgren & Klamberg, 2022). Despite these challenges, the UN has shown some adaptability by expanding the roles of special rapporteurs, investigative missions, and the Human Rights Council in order to mitigate institutional stagnation and maintain a level of international oversight (Piccone, 2016).

In contrast, regional organizations have responded differently to the demands of multipolarity. For instance, the EU maintains normative influence even amidst a fragmented international landscape by integrating human rights promotion into its foreign policy mechanisms, such as trade conditions through the GSP+ initiative (Cremona, 2017). While historically reluctant to intervene, ASEAN has begun taking human rights concerns more seriously, particularly through the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). However, its effectiveness remains limited due to a focus on sovereignty-based diplomacy and weak enforcement mechanisms (Davies, 2014).

NGOs and other non-state actors have also adapted their strategies to the constraints posed by multipolarity. Many organizations have formed transnational coalitions, engaged in internet activism, and participated in policy discussions within regional and global arenas, often facing greater challenges in authoritarian regimes (Heiss & Kelley, 2017).

3.5 Regional Variation in Human Rights Outcomes

Human rights protections and outcomes is not equal in different region of the glob, because of different establishment of human rights protections mechanism, accountabilities, public awareness etc. Suppose European human rights protections are stronger due to their well-established legal instruments and institutions, democratic practices and parallel court structure for protection of human rights i.e., ECHR (Greer, 2006). Along with these European Union ensure human rights by imposing a criteria for trade and other agreements (Cremona, 2017). But African and Asian regions are not well-structured by the way of European. Many countries in these areas face deep-rooted issues arising from their colonial pasts, such as arbitrary borders, exploitative institutions and persistent authoritarian rule that lingers even after gaining independence (Mamdani, 1996). These historical factors have frequently resulted in the formation of states with weak rule of law and low public trust in institutions, making the enforcement of human rights more challenging. Domestic political dynamics also significantly influence outcomes. In Asia, numerous governments emphasize economic growth and political stability at the expense of civil and political rights. For example, China and several Southeast Asian nations leverage state sovereignty and cultural relativism to resist external human rights pressure (Wilson, 2016). In Africa, issues like democratic decline, corruption, and armed conflicts often weaken human rights safeguards.

Nonetheless, there are exceptions countries such as Ghana and Botswana have made consistent rights-oriented reforms through a blend of democratic strengthening and civil society participation (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). Economic reliance affects how countries react to human rights demands. Nations dependent on foreign aid or trade with rights-promoting regions, like the EU, may display greater willingness to conform to international standards. For instance, some African and South Asian nations have adjusted labor laws or human rights practices to retain access to preferential trade agreements like GSP+ (International Labour Organization, 2023). Conversely, countries involved in economic partnerships that prioritize non-interference such as China's Belt and Road Initiative are less likely to face significant human rights conditionality (Subedi, 2015). Regional human rights courts exhibit different levels of effectiveness. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have played crucial roles in promoting accountability and influencing domestic legal reforms (Basch et al., 2010). These courts benefit from authoritative mandates and a tradition of legal pluralism, demonstrated by the binding nature of their rulings and some governments' willingness to comply. In contrast, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights has encountered challenges due to inconsistent state cooperation, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and limited public awareness (Viljoen, 2012). Additionally, several African nations have retracted their declarations permitting individuals and NGOs to directly bring cases to the court, which has curtailed its effectiveness. In Asia, the lack of a regional human rights court further exemplifies the region's hesitance to establish external accountability. Instead, mechanisms like the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) function under a non-confrontational approach, which restricts their capability to tackle severe violations (Davies, 2014).

3.6 Implications for the Global Human Rights Regime

The changing landscape of multipolarity, alongside variations between regions and alterations in institutions, presents both obstacles and possibilities for the international human rights framework. As power becomes more diffuse and global institutions experience challenges from nationalist and sovereignty-focused movements, the application of human rights standards is increasingly met with discord and division. However, this scenario could also foster creative approaches for promoting, validating, and protecting human rights in a swiftly evolving global landscape. A notable outcome is the diminishing consensus regarding enforcement mechanisms. In a multipolar context where influential nations hold conflicting values and interests, achieving coordinated reactions to large-scale atrocities or systemic human rights violations is becoming increasingly difficult (Roth, 2014).

The impasse of entities like the UN Security Council due to veto dynamics illustrates this dilemma, as evidenced by the ineffective interventions in crises such as those in Syria or Myanmar. While regional groups and informal coalitions sometimes step in to fill these voids, they frequently lack the capacity or authority to enforce international standards reliably. These changes prompt urgent inquiries into the sustainability of universalism in human rights. The notion that rights are innate and applicable to all individuals irrespective of their circumstances remains fundamental. Nonetheless, ongoing assertions of cultural relativism and sovereignty, particularly from rising powers underscore an increasing appeal for more diverse and context-sensitive approaches to rights (Mutua, 2002).

Although universalism remains a crucial ethical guide, its practical application may require adjustments to avoid being perceived as Eurocentric or imperialistic. A more dialogic version of universalism one that recognizes diversity while resisting relativism as a pretext for oppression might provide a constructive way forward (Donnelly, 2013). Given the obstacles posed by institutional fatigue and governmental pushback, non-state entities have become essential players in reshaping the human rights framework. Groups operating within global civil society, along with digital platforms and youth-led initiatives, are revitalizing conversations surrounding rights. Organizations like Fridays for Future, Black Lives Matter, and #MeToo illustrate how youth-driven activism, enhanced by digital connectivity, can attract global recognition, lead to government action, and establish new grassroots norms (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rajagopal, 2003).

These organizations frequently sidestep conventional institutions, opting to leverage social media, community networks, and public protests to shape agendas and confront both national and international power structures. Additionally, investigative journalism and digital forensic methods have improved accountability in areas where institutions fall short. Organizations like Bellingcat and Human Rights Watch utilize open-source intelligence (OSINT) to record war crimes, environmental degradation, and government surveillance. This shift in evidence collection and the promotion of norms emphasizes the increasing role of technology in redefining the protection and enforcement of human rights.

4. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- I. In Multipolar world western influenced human rights standard is losing its acceptancy for the reason of establishing anti-western values. We observe that China and Russia are promoting alternative values on human rights and influencing the glob not to tolerate interference in sovereignty. As a result, it creates challenges on fulfilling universal goals of human rights and counter the existing human rights enforcement mechanism.

With a view to address this issue, inclusive discussion should be initiate with both western and non- western stakeholders focusing on rebuilding a basic normative agreement on basic rights i.e., protection for torture, arbitrary detention, cultural protections on point of diversity, on which all stakeholders come to agree on one platform.

- II. Selective application of international regulations and politicisation of human right enforcing authorities is another important concern against human rights protection. As example we articulate the name of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), serving the objectives of powerful nations. As a result, human rights protection by these intuitions are lost *sing from the same hymn sheet of anti-western power*.

To rebuild trust, human rights-based organisation should adopt uniform and well accepted mechanism for investigating human rights violation and initiate unified grounds for imposing sanction against human rights violating countries. So that this unified mechanisms and grounds create bar on misusing sanctions on behalf of powerful state. Most importantly UN should adopt a clear regulation for using veto power regarding human rights issues and if possible then human rights related decisions should take on majority basis.

- III. Asia and Arica based human rights organisation are facing significant challenges on enforcement of regional charters regarding human rights for the reason of limitation of independency, foreign political interference and insufficient resources etc. This creates challenges on adequate responses to human right abuses.

To mitigate these challenges financial and operational independence can be a better cure. Strengthening authoritarian capacity to monitor and respond gross violation of human rights and developing cooperative partnership approach among civil societies nationally or internationally is also considerable solutions.

- IV. Though international institutions for protecting human rights adopt different enforcement mechanisms but it faces some sort of background challenges such as non-enforceability of international law nationally as a result timely response for protection of human rights is something *chasing rainbows*.

To solve this problem international community can promote development of trans-national legal instruments on common universal rights.

- V. In Global diplomacy policymakers undermines human rights issues at the time of negotiating national interest such as climate change, trade, migration, refugees etc. Along with, national authority downplays international regulations and accountabilities regarding human rights which create crucial challenges on protection of human rights.

To counter this trend 'Principal Pragmatism' can be an insightful strategy by which all parties can interact, coordinate and support on adherence of core human right principle. As a result, it harmonise geo political priorities by diplomatic efforts for safeguarding human dignity.

5. CONCLUSION

Protecting and promoting human rights is one of the biggest challenges in current glob. In multipolar world prospective, the universal application and enforcements of human rights standards face significant challenges. International institutions, starting from global bodies like the United Nations to regional organizations i.e., European Union, along with non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International, are mainly responsible for protecting and ensuring human rights. But their work is often limited because of political rivalries between states, differences in values and standards and various structural barriers. This research studies the role of these institutions in safeguarding human rights. The findings suggest that, while a multipolar world often results in institutional stagnation especially in bodies like the UN Security Council due to the influence of veto power, it also opens up avenues for competition in both economic and normative spheres.

The idea of an "Accountability Economy" arises, where nations enhance their human rights performance to gain economic benefits and global recognition. Furthermore, regional understandings of rights, although often influenced by political dynamics, support the development of frameworks that rooted in local realities. Nevertheless, significant challenges continue to hinder effective enforcements. The intuitional enforcement mechanisms remain inadequate, particularly in cases when powerful nations hinder action or reject jurisdiction, as evidenced by the case of Myanmar, Yemen and critiques of the ICC. In addition the role of non-state actors, including populist leaders and multinational corporations, create complications on enforcement further. The implications of these findings are twofold: first, global organizations must adapt to the realities of a multipolar landscape by fostering consensus through regional legitimacy and incentive systems. Second, the interconnectedness of trade, diplomacy, and human rights provides a strategic pathway for enhancing compliance. This research primarily employed doctrinal and analytical methods, relying on secondary sources and case studies. Future investigations should focus on empirical validation employing approaches such as institutional interviews or evaluations of regional human rights practices. These methods would allow for deeper exploration of the practical implementation of the proposed "Accountability Economy" framework.

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