

THE IMPACT OF JOKOWI ADMINISTRATION ON INDONESIA'S SOCIOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

One of the interesting phenomena about the administration of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) is the model of Sociopolitical relations. Interactions occur between the ruling elite and society. Therefore, it is difficult to avoid if the competition of interests between the ruling elite and society becomes dominant in the political process, both when making decisions and implementing policies through policy and administration. In the practice of power, President Jokowi's pattern of governance is seen as a transition towards political achievement that is more in line with current demands. Indonesia is also going through some changes in its own phase of political development. The phase is shaped by the diversity of presidential leadership styles that hold the reins of government. Each president exhibits a different form of government in line with the passage of time and the current political situation. Therefore, the differences in the form of government produce the dynamics of Indonesian political development since independence until now. Therefore, this study will focus on Jokowi's government and its impact on the socio-political development of Indonesia.

Keywords: Joko Widodo, Indonesia President, Government

Introduction

Political development is a change process which is marked by a number of indicators such as the nature of a government's institution, the sovereignty of law, the political participation of its nationals, human rights, freedom, economy and others, that serve to create a better environment than before. In other words, it is seen as shifting towards better political achievement in keeping with current demands. In the case of Indonesia, the state has also undergone several changes throughout the different phases of its political development. These phases feature the varying leadership style of the incumbent president. Each president exhibits different style of administration in keeping with the changing times and existing political environment. Hence, the various forms of administration have created Indonesia's political development dynamics since her independence right up to the present day.

Scholars felt that there was a need to conduct a comparative research to study the political leadership style of Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, with that of other Presidents before him from the start of the former's presidential election win on 9 July

2014. It was revealed that previous Presidents came from among those with military background or politicians. Indonesia has gone through various levels of political development since independence because of the different presidential leadership style. Each President exhibits his own distinctive leadership in legitimizing his power and in promoting Indonesia's political development. Indonesia's first President, Soekarno, led the state through his leadership style known as the 'Old Order'¹, which was interpreted as repressing the people's political rights and the use of government instruments to perpetuate and strengthen the political standing of the elites to the extent that they were able to usurp the country's economic strength. The 'New Order' under Soeharto was characterised by an authoritarian, bureaucratic and centralised leadership that used military power to repress and control the people, curb media freedom, introduce restrictive laws and that practised corruption, collusion and nepotism (in short, KKN²) to maintain their power.

After Soeharto's era, a new leadership order called the 'Reformation Order' by Indonesian political researchers emerged, starting from B.J. Habibie to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and led, currently, by Jokowi. Compared with previous leaders, Jokowi is the only civilian who does not come from an influentially-political elite family or within the military fraternity to ultimately become the President. Hence, attempts to maintain reformation in Indonesia's administration system now lies with Jokowi.

Indonesia's sociopolitical development prior to President Jokowi's Administration

Indonesia has undergone several political experiences since independence. Each President displays different ways of administrating the state. Labels like 'Old Order',

¹ The 'New Order' (in short, *Orba*) is a term that describes the administration of President Soeharto of Indonesia. The New Order replaces the Old Order which refers to Soekarno's era. The birth of the New Order started with the publishing of the Order of March the Eleventh, 1966 (Perintah 11 Mac 1966). The New Order lasted from 1966 to 1998. During that period, Indonesia's economy developed rapidly despite the widespread of corruption.

² KKN is defined in the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Law Number 28 Year 1999 regarding State Administrators Clean and Free from Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism. The practice of corruption, collusion and nepotism is widely referred to as KKN. KKN has a negative impact on the political, economic and financial sectors. They are capable of destroying the nerve of social life, the nation and the state as well as pose a danger to the very existence of the country.

'New Order' and 'Reformation' showed the nature of Indonesia's political development. Hence, the various administrations triggered the dynamics in the state's political development. Soekarno was the first president since Indonesia attained her independence. His regime was known as the Old Order with guided democracy as its form of administrative system. It is a democratic system that centred national decisions on the state leader (Lindsey, 2008: 34). His leadership was deemed autocratic as he had enforced anti-subversive laws in order to maintain the status quo and declared himself lifetime president. The focus on maintaining the legitimacy of power had affected the economy. It resulted in Indonesia suffering an increasing deficit of 14% in 1955, 16% in 1960, 174% in 1965 to 600% in 1966 (Mohtar Mas'ood, 1998: 213).

Indonesia was later ruled by Soeharto. His regime was identified as the New Order, with the Pancasila-based democracy³ as its form of government. It is a democratic system based on the mechanism of people's sovereignty in managing the state, in line with the 1945 State Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (in short, UUD45). Therefore, the governance of the state should run in accordance with the requirement of the said constitution (Crouch, 2010: 38). During the early years of his rule, Soeharto directed his attention on developing the economy of the state rather than on strengthening the political power. Soeharto exerted his legitimacy in the hearts of the people through two approaches; firstly, by overcoming and improving the economic crisis and, secondly, by stabilizing the political upheaval (Leo Agustino, 2013: 125). He lobbied and conducted diplomacy, introduced changes in the fiscal policy, encouraged foreign investment and opened the economy to liberalization, for example, by borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),⁴ and created the Ampera Cabinet and the Economic Stability Council which eventually took Indonesia's economy out of a bad financial crisis. Soeharto's initiatives and policies brought positive changes to Indonesia's economy. The state's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) under its First Five-Year Development Plan (Pelita I) from 1969 to 1974 saw its growth rate reached 8.6% (Langenberg, 1990: 135). The achievement prompted him into strengthening his power. He introduced political practices through the dual function of ABRI,⁵ which was an ideology that would enable the armed forces to be actively involved in the people's sociopolitical life (Jenkins, 2010: 104).

³ Pancasila, as the nation's and the national policy, is fundamental, comprehensive and of systematic value. Hence, the principle of Pancasila is a hierarchical, systematic and united union.

⁴ The IMF is an international organization based in Washington, DC., with a membership of 189 countries. It served to instil global financial cooperation, financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable world economic growth.

⁵ ABRI, short for Indonesia's armed forces, serves two functions, that is, for defence and security as well as consolidate the socio-political power. These are extremely important in creating national stability and are dynamic throughout all aspects of the nation's life in the context of unifying national resilience to achieve the state's national goals based on the Pancasila.

Soeharto also reformed the bureaucratic and political systems to manipulate the people so that the New Order regime would continue to gain legitimacy from the people. In addition, he was involved in the violations of human rights⁶ (HAM) with the arrest of people without trial in the 30th November 1965 incident. He also obstructed media rights and introduced laws that prevented women from having more than two children (Winters, 1998: 38). To consolidate his power, Soeharto implemented Law No. 5 of 1974 on Fundamentals of Administration in Regions that put the powers of the regions under the central government (Muhammad Agus Yusoff & Leo Agustino, 2012: 83). With respect to the party system, Soeharto unified the political parties in 1974 to create moderation in that system. Moreover, the weak financial management that resulted from the KKN practices, the widespread symptoms of corruption and the increased in the cost of living had the people rose against his administration.

With the end of the Old Order, Indonesia's politics moved towards a more democratic system referred to as the Reformation Order. It began under the rule of Habibie who was then the Vice President and who later became the third President of the Republic of Indonesia. At the start of his rule, Habibie formed his cabinet which was known as the Development Reformation Cabinet that received the support of the people as it reflected the synergy of the nation's power comprising various elements in the community's social political strength (Ginandjar Karrtasasmita & Stern, 2015:132). He also released political prisoners who were arrested without trial such as Mohammad Sanusi, Dr Sri Bintang Pamungkas, the leader of Indonesia Democratic Union Party (Parti Kesatuan Demokratik Indonesia, PUDI)⁷ and Dr Mochatar Pakpahan, the leader of Indonesia Prosperous Trade Union (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia) and Abdurrahman Wahid (Crouch, 2010: 193). These actions showed his openness in developing Indonesia with a new look. In addition, Habibie encouraged the establishment of political parties where, prior to this, there were only three parties with the publication of Law No. 2 Year 1999 (UU No. 2 Tahun 1999) on Political Parties and Law No. 3 Year 1999 on General Elections (UU No. 3 Tahun 1999).

President Habibie also established the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU)⁸ to oversee the general election compared with during Soeharto where

⁶ Human rights (in short, HAM, in Bahasa Melayu; *droits de l'homme*, in French) is a legal and normative concept that states that human beings have inherent rights because they are human beings. Human rights occur anytime, anywhere and to everyone. Hence, that right is universal.

⁷ The Indonesia Democratic Union Party (PUDI) was one of the political parties in Indonesia that had participated in the 1999 general election. The party had been in existence way before the reformation started, when the then ruler forbade any other parties besides the three that existed during that time, which was Golkar, the PPP and the PDI. The idea to establish the party started in 1993. PUDI also position itself as the opposition party which is a main part a democratic life.

⁸ The Republic of Indonesia's General Election Commissions (in short, KPU RI) is the national institution that oversees the general election in Indonesia.

the general elections were strictly controlled by the government and the military. Among the changes that Habibie had carried out were to give attention to the political problem in East Timor which wanted to break away from the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. He also abolished the military's dual function to maintain its professionalism without any influence from the President. With respect to the economy, Habibie restructured the Indonesian Bank (BI) so that it would be free to manage the economy. Nevertheless, Habibie was seen as having failed to deal with the symptoms of corruption, especially Soeharto and his cronies' corruption case, as he himself was considered part of Soeharto's New Order. His failure to prosecute Soeharto was seen as a 'change without change' (Winters, 1998: 152). Although Habibie had brought about several significant changes during his administration, several parties like the PDI-P and the PKB were still dissatisfied with his action in handling the East Timor problem, the KKN and the issue of HAM. Due to the dissatisfaction, Habibie resigned from the presidency on 20 October 1999.

After taking over the government from Habibie, Gus Dur reshuffled his cabinet by appointing several former military officers as his cabinet ministers. Gus Dur's action in appointing military officers was solely for political interests to ensure that his position is secured from any threats (Kingsbury, 2003: 132). Nevertheless, Gus Dur did not give the military important ministerial positions. The post of Defence Minister which would naturally be held by the military was placed on civilian leadership, that was, Prof. Juwono Sudarsono. It indicated his developed a civil-military relationship that prioritized civil supremacy. In addition, he introduced changes in the national bureaucratic structure by abolishing the Information Department (in short, Deppen), the Social Department (Depos), the National Stability Coordinating Agency (Baskorstanas) and the Specialized Research Institute (Litsus) to put a stop to government interference in the people's affairs (Crouch, 2010: 244). He also abolished the MPRS No. XXV/1966 Act on the prohibition of Marxism and Leninism ideology as the Act was deemed discriminatory, with its continual condemnation and suppression of the PKI descendants from becoming politicians, military officers and government servants (Barton, 2002: 215).

Moreover, Habibie defended the minorities by abolishing the President Instruction No. 14/1967 regarding legitimate and forbidden religions. This would enable the Chinese ethnics to enjoy religious freedom compared with Soeharto's era that forbade the Chinese ethnics from practising their beliefs and culture. In addressing the problems of corruption, Gus Dur established the Joint Team for Corruption Eradication (TGPTPK)⁹

⁹The Joint Team for Corruption Eradication, or TGPTPGK, was an anti-corruption agency that was formed by President Abdurrahman Wahid through the President Decree No. 19/2000. However, the legitimacy of the team was put into question as its establishment was said to be contrary to Law No. 31/1999 on the prevention of corruption. The Constitutional Court finally dissolved the institution.

that was responsible for investigating the problems of corruption. Unfortunately the efforts failed as it did not receive the support of the police intelligence agency and the political parties. Other changes that Gus Dur implemented included giving autonomy to regions that, during Soeharto and Habibie's leadership, was put under central authority with the establishment of the State Ministry for Regional Autonomy. The move brought more positive changes to Indonesia's politics. With respect to the economy, he had succeeded in increasing Indonesia's economic growth. In 1999, Indonesia recorded a growth of 0.13% only but in 2001 the economic growth increased to 4.8%. The success was attributed to two factors. Firstly, he reshuffled the cabinet and replaced it with more qualified ministers. Secondly, his policy to reduce oil subsidy as well as increase electric tariff, the price of transportation and cigarette tax (Revrison, 2000: 34). Although these actions were unpopular, they managed to increase the state's income. Nevertheless, Gus Dur was met with resistance from those who had vested interests when he fired several ministers and the corruption scandal that he faced (Bubandt, 2014: 96). The continuing conflict resulted in a special session by the DPR/MPR that decided to terminate Gus Dur's presidency (Syamsuddin Haris, 2007: 170).

After his impeachment by the legislature, the political parties within DPR/MPR elected Megawati as Indonesia's fifth President. She formed a Mutual Aid Cabinet comprising 14 political elite members as ministers (Robinson & Vedy Hadiz, 2004: 91). The appointment of the political elite was to ensure her position as the President. She also enacted Law No. 34 Year 2004 on the military as a professional national defence apparatus. It was to create a healthy democratic climate in the Republic and a progressive political development. In addition, Megawati formed the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)¹⁰ in 2002 to prevent abuse of power by the political elite. Among other changes that Megawati brought about was the amendment of Law Nos. 22 and 25 Year 1999 by replacing it with Law Nos. 32 and 33 Year 2004 to strengthen the implementation of regional autonomy. The laws explain the roles and functions of governors as representatives of the central government in ensuring a united and efficient bureaucratic management.

Megawati also initiated economy recovery programmes for Indonesia. The result was an increase in household consumption growth from 4.4% to 4.7%, whereas the government consumption expenditure reached 12.8% higher than the previous year at 9% (Hill, 2016: 283). The success was attributed to two factors. Firstly, she privatized national companies to bring in foreign capital to Indonesia and to reduce incidence of corruption in the handling of state-owned enterprises (Badan Usaha Milik Negara, in

¹⁰ KPK is a national institute that is free from any political influence in dispensing out its responsibility. It was established, not to take over the tasks of eradication of existing institutes, but as a motivator or stimulus so that efforts to eradicate corruption by existing institutes would be more effective.

short, BUMN). Secondly, she empowered the anti-corruption agency, KPK, as an independent body with full power to arrest anyone who abused their power that harms the state's finances. The result was an increase in the people's standard of living, decreased in the rate of poverty and a reduction in the state's foreign debt. Megawati was successful in paying Indonesia's debt of Rp116.3 trillion (Bresnan, 2005: 209). According to Indonesia's Statistics Centre (2013: 6), the poverty level in Indonesia decreased from 38.47 million (19.14%) in 2001 to 36.15 million (16.66%) in 2004. Nevertheless, during Megawati's administration Indonesia faced several terrorist threats.¹¹ The terrorist attacks took place at the Sari Club and Paddy's Bar in Kuta, Bali, in 2002. In 2003, there was a bombing incident at the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, followed by the incident at the Australian Embassy by a faction of the Jemaah Islamiyah¹² (Solahudin & Dave McRae, 2013). These incidents had tarnished Megawati's popularity. Megawati's failure to address the terrorist threats was attributed to her mistake in her choice of cabinet members. This is because she had dismissed SBY and Kalla from her cabinet. The dismissal had affected her popularity in the eyes of the people. It led to her losing the 2004 election to SBY.

The leadership of the three Presidents in the Reformation era, that is, Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati, had changed Indonesia's political development towards becoming more democratic and which received the support of the people. It posed a challenge to SBY to maintain the success of the leaderships before him. He worked to maintain the civil-military relations by appointing civilians as the Defence Minister. It was to beef up the military reformation so as to fortify the professionalism of the TNI.¹³ SBY was successful in solving the conflict in Aceh peacefully, enabling the people of Aceh to enjoy freedom and democracy in determining their leader. He also stepped-up the eradication of corruption and was consistent in his drive against it. According to the Indonesian Corruption Watch (2013: 9), about 60% of the corruption cases were successfully flushed out during his administration. Moreover, SBY enacted the State Regulations No. 19/2000 to facilitate the regional autonomy system that set out the roles and functions of governors in administering the regions.

His achievements in developing the bureaucracy brought changes to Indonesia's politics that had an impact on the growth of the state's economy. In 2005 to 2007, the

¹¹Terrorism is the use of violence to create fear in an effort to achieve one's goal (especially political aspirations). Meanwhile, terrorists are those who use violence to create fear (generally, for political reasons) and the act of violence are arbitrarily carried out with cruelty to induce fear by a person or a group.

¹² Jemaah Islamiyah is a terrorist group that was believed to be involved in the Bali Bombings on 12 October 2002 that killed 202 people in a few night clubs. After the incidents, the United States of America's State Department classified Jemaah Islamiyah as a foreign terrorist organization.

¹³ Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) comprises of three branches of the armed forces, that is, the army, navy and air force. Each of these branches is headed by the Chief of Staff, and the three Chiefs of Staff are led by the Commander of the TNI.

state's economic growth was 7% better than during the administrations of Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati, where the growth was recorded at merely 3.7% (Pepinsky, 2009: 77). Besides that, the position of Indonesia's democracy index under SBY administration was recorded at 53 in 2002, 54 in 2013 and 49 in 2014 (Freedom House, 2016). It showed that a good economic development had led Indonesia to a democratic political development.

The discussions above demonstrated that Indonesia's political development had progressed from being less democratic to more democratic. If one studies the political development in the Old Order to the New Order and subsequently to the Reformation Order, it was clear that the political development has shifted to a positive and better change. The analysis revealed that Indonesia's leaders had taken steps to improve past mistakes by disallowing the military from engaging in politics and businesses, enacting laws to eradicate the practices of corruption and KKN and holding fair and free election, among others. Their actions and the steps taken fulfilled the characteristics of political development that were discussed by scholars such as Huntington (1965), Pye (1966) and Apter (1967). Hence, political openness, justice and the prosperity created by SBY had resulted in better progress in Indonesia's political development. However, as SBY has held the Presidency for two terms, he was unable to stand for election in 2014 because the maximum period allowed for a person to hold the President post as stated in the Constitution is two terms.

Indonesia's sociopolitical development during President Jokowi's Administration

The sociopolitical development under Jokowi's administration can be observed from two approaches, that is, prior to his becoming the President and when he became Indonesia's President. Jokowi's desire to implement changes in Indonesia's policies so as to become more efficient could be seen prior to his presidency. He was the Mayor of Surakarta on 28 July 2005 until 1 October 2012. He was later appointed the Governor of Jakarta on 15 October 2012. On the 20th October 2014 general election, Jokowi won the Presidential seat to become the seventh President of Indonesia.

Policies prior to becoming President

Jokowi's aspiration to restore the locals' confidence and the reputation of a good administrator can be seen during his tenure as the Mayor of Surakarta. He had implemented several changes in policies and had carried out reformation in the city of Surakarta. It included providing new location for the sidewalk hawkers' (Pedagang Kaki Lima, PKL) industry. Like other cities, Surakarta has many sidewalk businesses that sell food and products, among others. The uncontrolled presence of these traders inadvertently caused traffic congestion, pollution and others. In addition, people in the surrounding areas had voiced their objection. To put a stop to this, Jokowi implemented

the relocation of such businesses to more suitable sites. Nevertheless, he had to deal with the challenges that came with implementing the relocation. For example, the traders continued to object to the relocation and refused to move from Taman Banjarsari to Kithilan Semanggi. To solve the problem, Jokowi sought a peaceful resolution by inviting them to lunch. Around 50 lunch talks were held within six months (Woischnik, 2014: 10). These series of invitations finally bore fruit where a consensus was reached to change the business location to the new site as stated above. Facilities and assistance were also offered. Finally, in July 2006, the relocation of the PKL industry was achieved. The efforts were able to guarantee order, cleanliness and the beauty of Surakarta.

The efforts and initiatives taken by Jokowi in bringing about change and renewal to Surakarta, gave him the image of a reformer¹⁴ in local politics. At the same time, despite holding the status of the local authority figure, he had narrowed the gap between the leader and his people. He had, among others, used the old official car and sat in economic class when travelling on official capacity besides channeling some Rp6.2 million from his salary to the city finance (Withaya Sucharithanarugse, 2016: 729). Moreover, in administering the local government, he often held department meetings every Monday and encouraged all government departments to cooperate in providing the best services to the locals. Every Friday, Jokowi and his deputy would conduct impromptu visits (*blusukan*) to certain settlement areas to listen to the needs and the desires of the people. Such practices had increased the efficiency of the services of the local government to the people of Surakarta. In addition, Surakarta was branded as the Javanese culture centre with the slogan 'Solo: The Spirit of Java' to stimulate tourism and economic growth (Mietzner, 2015: 13).

Hence, the changes and the renewals implemented by Jokowi had brought about many recognition to Surakarta. In 2009, Surakarta was named 'the most business-friendly cities in Indonesia'. At the end of Jokowi's first term of administration in Jun 2010, Surakarta was also recognised by UNESCO as a World Heritage City (Defny Holidin & Rilyan Shela Handini, 2014: 22). In addition, the city was chosen as MICE (meeting, incentive, convention, exhibition) activities network, becoming the host of the International Ethnic Music Festival in 2007, Solo Batik Carnival in 2008, the International Arts Festival in 2009 and the ASEAN Asia-Pacific Summit in 2011. Jokowi's leadership success in administering Surakarta highlighted many of his achievements. Indonesia's national magazine, *Tempo*, named him one of '10 Best Indonesian Mayors' in 2008. In 2010, Jokowi received the 'Changemakers Award' and the 'Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award'. In the following year, the Home Affairs Ministry

¹⁴What is a 'reformer'? A reformer is someone who brings about change and renewal to a thing or situation. It may also be defined as 'Those who support change'.

named him the 'Best Mayor 2011'. In 2012, Jokowi received third placing in the best mayor award from the World Mayor Foundation (Abdul Hamid, 2014: 89).

Jokowi has also implemented policies and drastic changes when he was appointed the Governor of Jakarta on 15 October 2012. At the beginning of his administration, Jokowi worked to eliminate previous legacies by introducing a slogan, 'New Jakarta'. The slogan was introduced to bring new hope and to serve as the best alternative for the people of Jakarta. Besides, it was seen as Jokowi's initiative to create his own identity in his administration. Hence, 'New Jakarta' was translated into several administrative initiatives to bring about change and renewal in Jakarta. Firstly, impromptu visits (*blusukan*)¹⁵ continued to remain Jokowi's identity in the administration of the government. He portrayed himself as a leader who is close to the people of Jakarta. The practice of doing rounds and meeting the community in Jakarta to listen to their grievances and offer best solution became his routine. Jokowi's show of concern inadvertently eliminated the gap between the elite politicians and the people, thus, making Jokowi approachable to the people of Jakarta. Other renewable steps taken by Jokowi included the reformation of the bureaucracy in which he introduced the merit system, *Lelang Jabatan*. The merit system was applied in the appointment of the heads of sub-districts (*camat*) and heads of villages. The main goal of the system is to appoint qualified candidates that meets the requirement of the positions.

In the context of infrastructural development, such as the plan in constructing the mass rapid transportation (MRT),¹⁶ Jokowi used the media channel to reach the people of Jakarta. For example, he used television broadcasting so that information pertaining to the discussions with the developer of the infrastructure would reach the people. This would ensure that plannings for the construction of the infrastructure was transparent and open to prevent speculations and secrecy between the government, the developer and the people (Okamoto, 2014: 10). At the end of 2012, Jokowi introduced the health care programmes in Jakarta by distributing Jakarta medical card (*Kad Jakarta Sehat*). It was a programme that provided health care to the people of Jakarta in the form of assistance for medicines. It was also aimed at providing the same assistance to poor families and the less privileged. Moreover, Jokowi launched the Jakarta smart card on 1 December 2012 to facilitate students to withdraw monies from ATMs to support their study needs and school uniforms. In bringing change and renewal, Jokowi also increased the minimum wage in the territory of Jakarta to 44% from Rp1.56 million (US\$132.4) to Rp2.2 million (US\$186.7) (Schwarz, 2015: 326). It was well received by

¹⁵ The term *blusukan* is derived from the Javanese language that refers to the unemployed. The comment came from Jokowi following the statement by the President's Special Staff, Heru Lelono, when Jokowi became the Governor of Indonesia.

¹⁶ Jakarta's Mass Rapid Transit, or better known as MRT, is the city's rapid transit system. The groundbreaking ceremony for the project was held on 10 October 2013. The first phase of the project was opened to the public in 2019.

the labourers but not the employers. Hence, for the purpose of transparency, Jokowi and his deputies declared their income and the territory's budget to public.

In addition, he relocated the sidewalk traders who was operating at the Sunday market and at the Tanah Abang market to a new building. Jokowi also had five traditional markets repaired and built. The traders were not subjected to any charges but were required to care for and maintain the facilities at the premise such as the water and electricity. In overcoming and reducing the impact of flood, Jokowi had the construction and maintenance of several dams carried out, such as the Ria Rio dam that costs Rp800 million, and the Pesanggrahan River deepen (Bimo Nugroho & M. Yamin, 2014: 27). His concerns over existing problems and the efficiency of his governance in bringing change and renewal to Jakarta resulted in Jokowi receiving solid support from the people of Jakarta.

Jokowi's victory was further strengthened by his capabilities, especially in terms of communication skills towards the people of Jakarta, as well as being known as a leader who exhibited a good reputation while holding office as the local leader. With such skills and capabilities, Jokowi received solid support from the people of Jakarta. The mass media, in turn, often portrayed Jokowi's authority as a charismatic leadership to the people of Jakarta and the people of Indonesia. As a result, his popularity continued to spiral with the quality of his leadership and efficient administration becoming the talk of the community. His reputation and performance described above became the trigger to the development of Jokowi's political career at the national level and is discussed in the following section.

Jokowi's policies as the President of Indonesia

Jokowi was prepared to continue with the reforms by strengthening the foundations of civil politics along with the goals of preventing the reversal to an iron-clad military rule (Schwarz, A., 2015: 325-342). Jokowi, in his presidential address on 20 October 2014, expressed his intention of empowering the nation and continuing with the reformation to protect the social, economic and political sovereignty of Indonesia. In line with this, Jokowi began his governance by identifying the main problems that had rocked the Indonesian nation since her independence, namely, the deterioration of national authority, national economic weakness and the manifestation of the national personality crisis. He had also introduced the vision and mission of his administration known as *NAWACITA*¹⁷ that constituted nine main agenda. Jokowi also pushed the people to

¹⁷*Nawa Cita* or *Nawacita* is a common term that was adapted from Sanskrit, *nawa* (nine) and *cita-cita* (hopes, agenda, desires). In the context of Indonesian politics prior to the 2014 Presidential Election, the term referred to the vision and mission of President Jokowi comprising the administration's agenda. It was also to continue Soekarno's struggle and aspirations for, what is known as, *Trisakti*, that is, to be politically sovereign, economically independent and having a personality in cultute.

exercise the spirit of mental revolution in their daily life until they were able to change their perspective, think and act according to current demands to compete with other nations in the world. *Nawa Cita* and the mental revolution was later integrated in a five-year development plan known as the National Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN)¹⁸ for 2015-2019 (Warbuton, 2016: 297).

In addition, Jokowi got the assistance of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to identify ministerial candidates who were free from corruption when setting up the Working Cabinet. His cabinet also comprised of professionals and who were not leaders of political parties. Jokowi was also consistent in eradicating corruption in his administration. For example, he had pushed for internal reformation of several government institutions. In the economic sector, Jokowi focused on the development of the infrastructure in an effort to boost economic development. His target was to boost the economic growth (GDP) to 7% within five years (Hill, 2016). Jokowi gave priority to several sectors in the development of the infrastructure. The first was the maritime sector where he had hoped to see Indonesia becoming the Global Maritime Fulcrum by constructing sea tolls to connect all the islands in the archipelago. The second sector was agriculture where he proposed to construct 49 dams within a year and create nine million hectares of agricultural land. The third was to develop road infrastructure by building highways and railroads to improve the transportation network throughout Indonesia. The fourth was centred on energy source infrastructure by increasing the construction of power generation sites. The infrastructure development implemented by Jokowi was also aimed at attracting foreign investors to accelerate Indonesia's economic development.

Nevertheless, despite the reformation that was carried out, he was smudged with several controversial issues in his administration. For example, Jokowi was accused of being influenced by the party's oligarch instructions in establishing the Working Cabinet and in his administration. As he did not have the background of a politically-influence network in Indonesia, his leadership was caught between his personal interests and the party in continuing the legitimacy of his power. Moreover, there were elements of the re-participation of the military in politics, for example, when he appointed Ryamizard Ryacudu as the Defence Minister and Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan as the Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment. Was Jokowi trying to re-instate military influence in Indonesian politics? Another issue that emerged under Jokowi's administration was related to poverty and inequality. According to Arief Anshory Yusuf & Andy Sumner (2015), the period between September 2014 and March 2015 indicated an increase in poverty among the population even though the economic growth had

¹⁸ The National Medium Term Development Plan (in short, RPJMN) is a document on development planning that was prepared for a period of five years and contains the explanation on the vision, mission and programmes selected by the President based on the 20-year National Long Term Development Plan (RPJP).

moved towards 5%. The fact raised the question of whether Jokowi was unable to look after the welfare of the people and bring about the economic development of Indonesia. The above discussion was further fortified by the statement of Burhanuddin Muhtadi (2015) when he claimed that Jokowi had concentrated on economic development rather than a democratic reformation since he came into power.

On 18 October 2019, a report on the achievements of Jokowi's administration was prepared and published by the Presidential Staff Office (KSP). The KSP is a non-structural government agency that carries out responsibilities and is accountable to the President of the Republic of Indonesia. The KSP had collected data from various ministries and institutions, emphasizing on several important achievements that were made by President Jokowi amidst the issues that had hit the Indonesian administration. According to the Presidential Chief of Staff, Gen. (Rtd) Dr. Moeldoko:

Indonesia's development was extremely good even though not everything has been fulfilled according to the initial target. Nonetheless, there were many positive indication towards positive changes.¹⁹

Jokowi's administration had completed its five-year term. Many of the important tasks were completed, including the accomplishments in the five years of governance. The five-year achievement report was officially published last year. The report contained the accomplishments and the development of Jokowi's *Nawacita* visions that was announced in 2014. There were three main pillars in the report that also reflected the three pillars that formed *Nawacita*, that is, socio-culture, economy and politics. According to Intan Umbari Prihatin (2020),²⁰ Jokowi claimed that he would uphold economic growth and work to keep his promise:

The President continued to hold the vision of manifesting five strategic directions towards an Indonesian community that is independent, progressive, just and prosperous. Refocusing and reallocating budget on prioritized programmes and in handling the health sector, social and economic recovery, especially the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (*Usaha Mikro, Kecil dan Menengah*, UMKM) as well as the cooperatives.

In the political field, the head of state had ensured protection and safety, clean government, development in villages and rural areas and the enforcement of the

¹⁹Dr. Moeldoko. (2020). KSP Siapkan Laporan 5 Tahun Pemerintahan Jokowi-JK. Source: KSP official website, <https://ksp.go.id/ksp-siapkan-laporan-5-tahun-pemerintahan-jokowi-jk.html>

²⁰ Intan Umbari Prihatin. (2020). KSP Rilis Laporan Tahunan: President Jokowi Tak Pernah Abaikan Janji. <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/ksp-rilis-laporan-tahunan-presiden-jokowi-tak-pernah-abaikan-janji.html>

regulatory system as priority in the political development. One of the accomplishments in the foreign policy field was Indonesia's election as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for 2019-2020 (Gen. Rtd) Dr. H. Moeldoko, S.I.P, 2019).

I have seen that in the past five years we had drawn up a foundation for the direction of the national development to be more responsive, productive, equitable, and we have also carried out reformation in the fiscal sector so much so that our APBN [state expenditure budget] has become healthier and more independent. (Jokowi, 2019)²¹

In the economic sector, the government has seen to the increase in the Indonesian standard of living, the productivity of the people and the competitiveness of the nation, as well as the independence and the revitalization of strategic sectors that were prioritized. This was evident in the increased in the score of Ease of Doing Business, a proof of the government's commitment in implementing continuous structural improvements. Efficient regulations were the key to an accelerated economic development. The electrification ratio, which was a part of the 35 million MW programme initiated by the government, had also reached 98.8%. According to the Presidential Chief of Staff, Gen. (Rtd) Dr. Moeldoko:

The development of an infrastructure is a legacy. The Jagorawi tolled road was the first toll and has been imitated in many countries but only after many years had the 280-kilometer stretch been completed. However, under Jokowi's administration a stretch of 1,250 kilometer road has been built within five years.²²

It was also evident in President Jokowi's explanation claiming that he was very serious in carrying out national development in accordance with the economic development that was capable of adding value to the Indonesian community so as to enable them to increase their income and economic opportunities. Jokowi (2019) stated that:

We have laid the foundation for an Indonesia centric, not Java centric, in accelerating infrastructure. We have also initiated structural reformation, although not in a large scale. We hope though in the coming five years we would be able to implement structural reform on a larger scale in a move to increase competitiveness, bypassing a number of inhibiting and convoluted rules and procedures that we faced today. We have also carried out reforms in the field of social protection and poverty reduction, especially for the communities of 40% and below.²³

²¹ President Joko Widodo (2019), at the Plenary Cabinet Session speech for the period 2014-2019 in Jakarta, 3 October.

²² Dr. Moeldoko. (2020). *Op. Cit.*

²³ *Ibid.*




Diagram 1: Economic Achievement in the era of President Jokowi 2014-2019²⁴

With respect to the cultural and social sector, the government had guaranteed the rights of the people to land under the land distribution programme which was designated for land reform with the realization that until Jun 2019, would cover 558,700 plots and 418,748 hectares. The most popular policy approach that was launched by President Jokowi was the implementation of social aid in the form of Smart Indonesian Card that had been distributed to 18.9 million students, followed by the Family Hope Programme for 10 million families and 96.8 million participants of the Healthy Indonesian Card. According to the official report on five years of advancement and achievement of the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla administration (2019), the main role of the social development landscape was for an Indonesian community of profound characteristics. In addition, it stated that:

Personality in culture should be reflected in every aspect of life. Independence actually reflects the attitude of a person or a nation regarding their identity, their community and their enthusiasm when confronted with various challenges. As far as attitude us concerned, independence is basically a cultural problem in the broadest sense of the word. The government encourages the rise of Indonesian characters, including meeting

²⁴The source is taken from the Official Report on Five Years Advancement and Achievement of Joko Widodo - Jusuf Kalla. p. 88.

the basic needs and increasing the nation's accomplishment as one of the centres of world civilization, and showing respect for diversity which is a priority in the sociocultural field.

Looking at President Jokowi's experiences in governing Indonesia between 2005 and 2014, there were various records of achievement as well as shortcomings in the policies that he had implemented in building the country, namely, policies that Jokowi had carried out during his time as the mayor of Surakarta and Governor of Jakarta. Since he became the President in 2014 until today there were drastic changes. The last five years since his presidency showed that the people of Indonesia had accepted Jokowi's administration and policies, with the various changes that he had implemented. The actions taken by Jokowi would become the basis for policies that would prepare an Indonesian nation that is more advance in the future. This can be seen from the positive shift in the people's support for him. In Indonesian politics, the people were more confident with Jokowi. Jokowi's style of leadership when he was a mayor and a governor, conducting impromptu visits which was considered a popular move, boosted his political career. Using his authority, he made many reforms through transactional leadership.

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