

## SHAKIB ARSLAN AND ARAB UNITY

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### Abstract

This article studies Prince Shakib Arslan's contributions to the demand and articulation of Arab unity as the Ottoman caliphate ended and the Unionist Party represented a departure from positive politics responding to Arab interests. Shakib Arslan once advocated for the Ottoman League and Islamic unity, before focusing on Arab nationalism and Arab unity more specifically after 1923. He corresponded with Arab rulers across the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Syria. He communicated with Arab intellectuals and Arab students abroad to create his vision of unity with modern media. He argued for Arab unity, which he referred to as a strategic necessity to deal with colonial dangers as well as a complete Arab revival in a renaissance. He contributed to a ground-breaking vision of what Arab unity meant, in part identifying weaknesses within the Arab population and providing practical solutions in approaching this idea for the first time.

**Keywords:** Shakib Arslan, Arab Unity, Ottoman Caliphate, Colonialism, Arab Renaissance, Arab Nationalism, Arab Intellectual History, Islamic Unity.

### INTRODUCTION

This study is important to show the role of Prince Shakib Arslan in calling for the unification of the Arab nation. He had previously called for the preservation of the Ottoman League and Islamic unity. After the Unionists deviated in their policies towards the Arabs and the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, Arslan began calling for Arab unity in 1923. He intensified his contacts with the Arab rulers in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Syria, and with Arab thinkers and students studying abroad to promote the idea of unity through the media available at that time, indicating the importance of unity to confront the colonial danger and protect the Arabs from that danger.

Arslan defined the form of unity among the Arabs as a form of cooperation in the economic and customs fields, the abolition of borders between Arab countries, and the facilitation of the movement of Arab citizens, while preserving the political independence of each country.

In the early thirties of the last century, Arslan intensified his contacts with Faisal I, King of Iraq, in order to unify Syria and Iraq to be the nucleus of a comprehensive Arab unity.

The study clarified the French, Turkish, Arab, Zionist, and Arab newspapers' positions on the ideas of unifying Syria and Iraq. The idea of unity between Syria and Iraq did not stop until the death of Faisal I in 1933, as he pinned great hopes on Faisal I to achieve unity between the two countries. However, Shakib Arslan continued to raise the issue of Arab unity on all the occasions in which he participated until he died in 1946.

### Introduction to Prince Shakib Arslan

He is a Lebanese prince - the prince of rhetoric - born on December 5, 1869, in his town of Choueifat, south of Beirut. He studied Arabic at Al-Hikma School and received

jurisprudence, monotheism, and logic from Imam Muhammad Abduh at the Sultanate School in Beirut during his exile from Egypt. Arslan composed poems and published them in the newspaper (Al-Jannah), which was supervised by his teacher Abdullah Al-Bustani.

He published his poetry collection (Al-Bakura) in 1887, and visited Egypt in 1890 and got to know its scholars and politicians. He traveled to Istanbul in late 1889 and met Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. He wrote in Arab newspapers such as Al-Ahram, Al-Muayyad, Al-Shura, Al-Fath magazine, and others. In 1890, he traveled to France and met Ahmed Shawqi. He later mentioned that meeting in his book (Shawqi or 40 Years of Friendship). He then returned to Lebanon and was appointed Qaim Maqam for the Choueifat district for three years. He was then elected as a representative of Hauran in the Ottoman Parliament in 1908, and was elected as a member of the Arab Scientific Academy in Damascus in 1920. He then returned to Europe and resided in Lausanne, then settled in Geneva and participated with Arslan in establishing the Syrian-Palestinian Conference held in Geneva in 1921. He was elected as its Secretary-General. In 1930, he published the newspaper (Al-Umma Al-Arabiya) in Geneva and participated in supervising it. Ihsan al-Jabiri, but it stopped in 1938. Before that, he expressed his ideas and defended them in the Al-Manar newspaper, which belonged to his friend Muhammad Rashid Rida. Then he returned to Lebanon and died there in 1946<sup>(1)</sup>.

### **Call for Arab Unity**

Shakib Arslan began calling for Arab unity in the aftermath of World War I when the Kemalists resorted to implementing a secular system and abolishing the Islamic Caliphate<sup>(2)</sup>, in 1923, he published a statement to the Arab nation in which he explained the importance of Arab unity in facing challenges<sup>(3)</sup>.

Arslan promised Arab unity as a strong alternative necessary to preserve the entity of the Arab nation, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore he said: (The Ottoman Empire has gone, and its unity has gone and its carpet has been folded, but as for the Arab nation, its unity will not cease to be the anthem of the hopes of the Arabs)<sup>(4)</sup>.

This indicates that Arslan hoped to restore Ottoman unity and thus expand the scope of Islamic unity. When he felt the difficulty of achieving that dream, he resorted to calling for Arab unity, as an alternative to Ottoman unity, trying to make the Arabs aware of its importance in preserving Arab rights, at a time when the weak were not respected.

On the subject of unity, Prince Shakib Arslan exchanged letters with Abdulaziz Al Saud, Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din, and Faisal I, King of Iraq<sup>(5)</sup>. The number of letters exchanged between Shakib Arslan and these leaders, as confirmed by Shakib, reached one hundred and fifty letters. Faisal I confirmed that Shakib Arslan was the first Arab figure with whom he discussed the issue of Arab unity, saying: (I testify that you are the first Arab who spoke to me about Arab unity and wanted it to be a practical unity)<sup>(6)</sup>, Shakib Arslan also met King Farouk and told him: "The Arabs should not remain separate from Egypt"<sup>(7)</sup>.

It is noteworthy that when Arslan called for unity among the Arabs, their countries were not independent, as he made contacts with Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Yahya Hamid al-Din,

Faisal I, and King Farouk, while some of their countries were linked by protection treaties with Britain, and others were under direct British mandate, which makes us wonder, did Arslan have secret friendly contacts with Britain, such that it did not prevent him from making those contacts? Or perhaps Arslan was making these contacts (correspondence) between himself and these leaders secretly?

Arslan explained the importance of Arab unity in preserving the entity of the nation, as the issue is not a matter of positions or personal ambitions, but rather the issue of the nation that must be above all immediate interests, as Arab unity preserves the nation from falling under foreign control.

To achieve Arab unity, Shakib Arslan called on Arab leaders to reject personal differences and give priority to the general Arab interest over them, as estrangement and conflict fragment the nation, and therefore Arslan asked Faisal I, Imam Yahya, and Abdul Aziz Al Saud to leave behind personal differences and work for Arab unity<sup>(8)</sup>.

### Unit shape

The form of unity proposed by Arslan in 1925 AD was as follows:

1. An alliance that guarantees each Arab country its internal independence, connects the Arab countries with a single railway, and establishes a network of land and sea roads.
2. Determining the borders between the Arab countries, and agreeing to cooperate in confronting criminals and handing them over.
3. Unifying customs, mail, foreign policy, and education
4. Forming a general council to supervise common issues<sup>(9)</sup>.

When examining the form of unity proposed by Arslan in 1925, it is noted that he avoided calling for the formation of a single Arab political entity, which he had previously confirmed. It seems that he had a preconceived notion of the difficulty of forming this entity, as it was unlikely that the Arab leaders would agree at that time to give up their positions in exchange for the establishment of a unified state, which made Arslan not present this proposal, contenting himself with calling for the achievement of common interests among the sons of the Arab nation. It is worth noting that what Arslan presented in 1925 can be used in our present time, and built upon in achieving integration among the Arab states.

Arslan suggested that Arab thinkers work to implement these ideas through schools, the press, clubs and associations. Arslan stressed that Arab unity could be similar to the Swiss Confederation, the German Confederation or the United States of America, and if implemented in this way, it would be an indication of the beginning of the Arab Renaissance<sup>(10)</sup>. However, this call for unity did not meet with success at that time because the colonists, at that time, were the ones who had the power to decide and bind most of the Arab world, and they did not agree to it, and it remained an idea in the minds of most Arab men<sup>(11)</sup>.

Arslan tried to spread the idea of Arab unity among the Arab masses by broadcasting it in the circles of science and culture, in order to form a popular base aware of the importance of unity. It seems that his goal in educating the Arab people and notifying Arab thinkers of the importance of unity, aims to create an effective means of pressure on the Arab rulers to convince them of the necessity of following the path of unity.

Based on his unity idea, Shakib Arslan supported Abdul Aziz Al Saud's annexation of the Emirates in the Arabian Peninsula and their unification by force<sup>(12)</sup>. He confirmed this in one of his letters to Rashid Rida, saying: "My master, would it have been better for the Arabs for Hail to remain an emirate, Asir an emirate, and the Hijaz an emirate, or for them all to unite into one kingdom with power and glory?"<sup>(13)</sup>. He praised the efforts of Ibn Saud for what he did in the Arabian Peninsula and its unification, saying: (We loved Ibn Saud because he united an Arab bloc of about four million in the Arabian Peninsula) and he called on the Levant to follow the example of Ibn Saud to achieve its unity<sup>(14)</sup>.

Arslan did not support Ibn Saud's annexation of the emirates of the Arabian Peninsula out of spite for their leaders, but rather that support came from his unification ideology, as he realized the importance of the geographical and demographic factor in supporting the military and political power of the Arabian Peninsula, and thus building a strong, unified state capable of confronting external dangers.

Arslan focused on starting Arab unity in the Asian part of the Arab homeland. As for the Maghreb, despite the ties that connect it to the Arab East, in terms of customs, traditions, and language, Arslan did not call for its unification with the East. Arslan believes that there are geographical reasons represented by the great distance between the East and the West that prevent their unification. He also did not include them in his unity program, for fear of inciting the colonial countries against them<sup>(15)</sup>. Therefore, Arslan said: (With regard to the countries located in North Africa, at the present time - that is, when the idea of unity is adopted - it is sufficient to create moral and spiritual links between them and the East)<sup>(16)</sup>.

Arslan believes that the social factor is the strongest factor linking nations, and that its pillar is language and culture before any other link. Therefore, in 1927, he stressed the importance of spreading literary propaganda in Syria, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, and convincing the people that they are one nation and their origin is one. He called on the Hijazi, Iraqi, Yemeni and Syrian governments to make spreading the idea of unity their first concern. He also called on thinkers to participate in spreading the idea, then he said: (The political gathering can only be achieved by gathering the people socially and spreading the spirit of literary unity)<sup>(17)</sup>.

In 1929, Shakib Arslan reiterated his call for Arab unity and stressed the role of youth in spreading the idea of unity. He also called on Arabs to refrain from immediate conflicts, as unity is above all considerations<sup>(18)</sup>. He continued to call for Arab unity and did not miss any suitable opportunity to talk about it. In 1929, he spoke about Zionism and its danger to the Arabs, Britain's support for it, and its disdain for the Arabs. He pointed out that the Arabs' problem was disintegration and fragmentation, and that the reason for the

victory of their enemies was their differences among themselves and their failure to agree on one word and one goal<sup>(19)</sup>.

In 1930, Arslan blamed the Arabs for their failure to strive seriously for Arab unity, and he spoke sarcastically, saying: "If we called upon the Muslims to give in the way of the most sacred national or ethnic cause, they would refrain or be reluctant, but if they were told that there was a shrine for a saint or the grave of one of the righteous, they would race to donate for its construction. So, it would be nice if we made a dome for the Arab unity project and named it after one of the sheikhs, so that it would collect a lot of aid"<sup>(20)</sup>.

### Unity of Syria and Iraq

Arslan called for the unity of Syria and Iraq under the Faisal crown, after Iraq signed the Iraqi-British Treaty in 1930 AD<sup>(21)</sup>. He discussed the issue of unity with Faisal I in the Swiss city of Bern in 1931, and stressed to him that the issue of unity was the issue of a nation and not the issue of an individual. He said: (The issue is not an issue of individuals, but an issue of a nation, so that Ali would be pleased<sup>(22)</sup>). Or get angry, if the union of Iraq and the Levant is done by you, do not care), and Faisal asked him and he said: (So you are satisfied with this union, we said Glory be to God, are we not satisfied with an Arab state of two million, then it becomes six million and later seven million, and it is a reason for the union of the Arabs? Is it better for us to remain in this dispersion, scattering, and fragmentation, and to be subjects of foreigners and under the danger of a Turkish or British raid?) Arslan asked Faisal I to discuss with Abdul Aziz Al Saud the Iraqi-Syrian unity project, and to seek Ibn Saud's support for this project in exchange for Faisal's recognition from Hussein of the reality in the Hijaz, and thanks to Arslan's efforts, the two leaders met in the Al-Jawf region and discussed the issue of the Syrian-Iraqi unity and the issue of Faisal's recognition of the Hijaz as an integral part of Saudi Arabia<sup>(23)</sup>.

Shakib Arslan believed that if the Iraqi-Syrian unity was achieved, it would be the nucleus of comprehensive Arab unity, and Arab unity would then be achieved gradually<sup>(24)</sup>. This is done by concluding economic, administrative, military, and cultural agreements. Arslan does not believe that these agreements should be reached all at once to achieve political unity. For example, when Germany achieved complete political unity, it took about 30 years<sup>(25)</sup>.

Shakib Arslan was urging Faisal bin Hussein to move forward with the unity project, and not to pay attention to what the pessimistic newspapers were publishing against the Iraqi-Syrian unity project<sup>(26)</sup>.

Arslan stressed that one of the most important pillars for the success of this project is the scientific renaissance. Therefore, Faisal bin Hussein called for attention to science, getting rid of ignorance, spreading the idea of unity in Iraq, and working to convince Iraqis of its importance<sup>(27)</sup>.

Shakib Arslan explained the importance of Syrian-Iraqi unity, as it is a means of confronting the Zionist project aimed at establishing a Jewish national homeland in Palestine. When Syria and Iraq unite, it becomes not unlikely that East Jordan will join



this union, which means the automatic collapse of the idea of a Jewish national homeland, weakens the position of the Maronites in Lebanon, and ends their political role<sup>(28)</sup>.

Unity helps to speed up the achievement of independence in Syria, so Arslan said: (As for the part that is incomplete in its independence not being able to ally with the part that is complete in its independence, if we seek an alliance, it is to complete the incomplete utilizing the complete one)<sup>(29)</sup>. The success of the unity project between Syria and Iraq also means protecting these two countries from the colonial threat<sup>(30)</sup>.

In an article published in Al-Shura newspaper in March 1931, Shakib Arslan said: (We cried until we became blind to see the implementation of the Arab alliance project, and we agreed that there is no life for the Arabs in this era and the one that follows it except through it, because it is the only means to repel colonialism)<sup>(31)</sup>. If the Arabs had been united, Britain would not have been able to issue the Balfour Declaration and hand Palestine over to the Jews, but its sense of the state of fragmentation that the Arabs were living in encouraged it to issue it<sup>(32)</sup>. Therefore, Arslan asked Faisal I not to pay attention to Arab partisan conflicts and personal rivalries to complete the Iraqi-Syrian unity project, based on his concern for the general Arab interest, until the nucleus of Arab unity is formed that is capable of resisting Western ambitions in the Arab countries<sup>(33)</sup>. Speeding up the implementation of unity helps stop the Zionist project and prevents it from being implemented<sup>(34)</sup>. Unity prevents the Jews from controlling the Arab wealth in the Dead Sea and preserves the oil wealth in Iraq, and the major powers cannot attack the rights of the Arabs<sup>(35)</sup>. Unity also prevents Turkey from achieving its ambitions to seize Aleppo, the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and Antioch. The Turkish Foreign Minister at the time, Tawfiq Rushdi, tried to get close to Arslan to convince him to stop calling for Syrian-Iraqi unity<sup>(36)</sup>, but Shakib Arslan refused. Shakib Arslan preferred Faisal I to lead a united state<sup>(37)</sup>. (King Faisal preferred the Khedive, after Iraq became independent, and the hope was pinned on its union with the Levant, as the Arab national interest is not what personal whims and private relationships are based on)<sup>(38)</sup>. The reason for his preference for Faisal I to head the unity state was due to the political flexibility that Faisal I enjoyed, in addition to the possibility of an Iraqi-French rapprochement after oil was discovered in Iraq, as the French and British were looking to strengthen the relationship with Faisal I to benefit from Iraq's oil. Faisal was also distinguished by his shrewdness and cunning, and was more acceptable to the Syrians because he had previously ruled Syria<sup>(39)</sup>. There are no geographical or cultural barriers separating Syria and Iraq. All of these are factors that facilitate the achievement of unity between Syria and Iraq<sup>(40)</sup>.

Thus, Shakib Arslan made it clear that the goal of the unity of Syria and Iraq, and the nomination of Faisal bin Hussein to lead the Syrian-Iraqi unity, is not subject to personal whims, but rather aims to achieve the general Arab interest<sup>(41)</sup>.

Shakib Arslan called on Faisal I to exploit the desire of the two countries - Britain and France - to improve their relations with him, so he asked him to present the project of Syrian-Iraqi unity to them, and suggested that the form of the union should be on the model of Austria and Hungary, and if Syrian-Iraqi unity was achieved and Faisal was pledged allegiance to as king of Syria and Iraq, he must work to document the scope of

the unity to include the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and then the three leaders would have laid a strong foundation for comprehensive Arab unity<sup>(42)</sup>. Faisal discussed this issue with the French, but they did not agree to it<sup>(43)</sup>.

Shakib Arslan called on Arab students in Paris to support this project, as it is a vital Arab project<sup>(44)</sup>. He urged Ibn Saud and the Imam of Yemen to support him, and stressed that strengthening the Arab nation is not limited to the union of Syria and Iraq, but must include Yemen and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula in the form of a military, economic, and political alliance<sup>(45)</sup>.

### **The French, Turkish, Arab, and Zionist positions on the idea of the unity of Syria and Iraq**

The French opposed the Syrian-Iraqi unity project, as they feared that the union between Syria and Iraq would lead to the end of their influence in Syria<sup>(46)</sup>. He was also opposed by the Turks, who were planning to control the northern parts of Syria and Iraq<sup>(47)</sup>. Arslan insisted on continuing to implement the project and sought to ally with the Hijaz and Yemen to strengthen the Syrian-Iraqi unity in the event of its success, and to deprive Türkiye of the opportunity and prevent it from achieving its ambitions<sup>(48)</sup>. The Jews stood against the unity project because they were certain that the Syrian-Iraqi unity would constitute a blow that would prevent the implementation of the idea of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine<sup>(49)</sup>.

The Beirut newspaper Al-Ahrar attacked Shakib Arslan's efforts to achieve unity between Iraq and Syria, describing his efforts as inapplicable in light of the French presence in Syria and the British presence in Iraq. The newspaper added: "Although King Faisal wanted to serve the Arab nation and return it to its former glory, he was unfortunately forced and had no choice, and the people of Iraq were not satisfied with this fake independence"<sup>(50)</sup>. The members of the National Bloc in Syria were divided into two groups, one group opposed the idea and the other supported it. Among the supporters was Abdul Rahman Al-Shahbandar, who said: (We are republicans and we will not back down from the republic. However, if there is a vital interest, such as the union of Iraq and Syria, then it is an event that takes precedence over any form of government). Arslan confirmed that the opponents of this project from the members of the National Bloc were only concerned with their personal interests and the general good of Arabism<sup>(51)</sup>.

Ibn Saud's supporters resisted the idea of Syrian-Iraqi unity, fearing the expansion of Hashemite influence in the Levant, which might expose their rule in the Arabian Peninsula to Hashemite danger, although Shakib Arslan had stipulated to Faisal since he proposed the idea that he would recognize Saudi control over the Hijaz<sup>(52)</sup>.

What confirms Abdul Aziz Al Saud's dissatisfaction with the implementation of the unity idea is the cutting off of the aid he was sending to the magazine that Shakib Arslan was publishing in Geneva (The Arab Nation)<sup>(53)</sup>.

Some Egyptian newspapers accused the project of being a British plot that did not serve the Arabs. They also accused Arslan of seeking to achieve personal goals without clarifying what those goals were<sup>(54)</sup>.

The Palestine newspaper claimed that the Syrian-Iraqi unity project was a British-Jewish plot aimed at containing the Arabs under British supervision, through Britain's desire to establish a railway between Syria and Iraq, so that Britain could tighten its control over the Levant. Arslan confirmed that the project was a purely Arab idea and that Britain had no other connection to this project<sup>(55)</sup>.

Arslan responded to the allegations of the Egyptian press by saying: (But we ask our Egyptian brothers, if someone tells them: Their clinging to the issue of annexing Sudan to Egypt is a fantasy, and that they must cut off all hope from Sudan because England does not allow it, would they be satisfied with this statement, and with this speaker? We think the answer is no. So, what is the difference between the issue of Sudan and the issue of Iraq? Why are these fantasies and those not fantasies)? <sup>(56)</sup>.

He said (and perhaps they say that Sudan was affiliated with Egypt, and the answer is: Syria and Iraq 15 years ago were originally one kingdom, and the answer is: Iraq was affiliated with the Levant during the time of the Umayyads and the Levant was affiliated with Iraq during the time of the Abbasids. The answer is that the distance between Baghdad and Damascus is closer than between Cairo and Khartoum). Arslan also confirmed that there is no economic, geographical, or even political reason preventing the unity of Iraq with Syria<sup>(57)</sup>. Arslan had predicted since 1932 the approach of World War II, and he began to alert the Arabs to the importance of unity to protect themselves from the coming colonial dangers. He based his predictions on what he had observed of an arms race between the major powers, especially Germany and France, and the weakness of the political role of the League of Nations and its inability to resolve international conflicts.

He said: (So what have the Arabs prepared to face this danger? Have they united? Have they manufactured weapons? If they do not unite, their fate will be foreign control over them)<sup>(58)</sup>. In 1933, Arslan suggested to Rashid Rida and the Jerusalem Committee, which emerged from the Islamic Conference, a national conference in Baghdad to raise the issue of Arab unity<sup>(59)</sup>.

The following topics were discussed:

1. The issue of Arab unity is based on starting with the unification of natural Syria with Iraq.
2. Striving to ally with independent Arab governments.
3. Striving to unify the system of education and general Arab culture, including forming a committee or committees to compose school books and general books and publish stories, anthems, and national songs.
4. Establishing a financial system for the General Conference and subcommittees.
5. Cooperation between Arab parties and associations.



Arslan Rashid Rida demanded that the conference be limited to Syrian, Iraqi, and Palestinian delegates so that no other topic be discussed other than the issue of Syrian-Iraqi unity<sup>(60)</sup>.

After the death of Faisal I in 1933, Arslan stopped calling for the Iraqi-Syrian unity project. He said: (I felt the enormity of the tragedy on the day Faisal died, but now I see it growing little by little than before, as the Iraqi-Syrian union has become abandoned and no one is talking about it<sup>(61)</sup>).

Shakib Arslan hoped to carry out this project in cooperation with Faisal I, but when he died, the project remained and was not implemented.

Arslan pinned his hopes on Faisal I to achieve the nucleus of Arab unity, so he began calling for achieving Iraqi-Syrian unity, under his leadership, taking into account the political and economic conditions of both countries (Syria and Iraq) when he raised the issue of unity.

It seems that Arslan believed that Britain would not put obstacles in Faisal's way to achieve the unity state, since Britain was the one that helped Faisal reach the throne of Iraq, after the French occupied Syria. On the other hand, Arslan believed that implementing this project was possible because Faisal had previously been king of Syria, and France was ready to cooperate with him after oil was discovered in Iraq in 1925.

Arslan stopped calling for this project after the death of Faisal I, as he did not see the same qualifications in his successor, King Ghazi.

Arslan gave a lecture on September 20, 1937, at the Arab Club in Damascus, in which he explained the challenges facing the Arab nation<sup>(62)</sup>. He pointed out the importance of unity in confronting European ambitions in the Arab countries, and he returned to emphasize the form of Arab unity to be a military, economic, and educational unity and cooperation in foreign political issues while maintaining the internal independence of each Arab country.<sup>(63)</sup>

When the Arab League was established, he was one of the first to support it as an important step towards unifying the Arab nation<sup>(64)</sup>. Thus, Arslan adhered to Arab unity until his death.

## CONCLUSION

It is noted that Arslan adopted the idea of unity after 1923, and he made great efforts to achieve that dream, and he made contacts with the Arab leaders in the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Iraq and Syria, as well as with Arab thinkers, and he adhered to his call for unity until his death in 1946.

Arslan believed that Arab unity was the alternative to preserving the Arab identity and restoring its entity after the end of the Ottoman Caliphate at the hands of the Kemalists. It is worth noting that Arslan did not miss an opportunity, except that he tried to think about Arab unity and highlight its importance.

## Footnotes

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- 11) Shakib Arslan, The Prince Speaks about the Syrian Issue, Al-Jami'a Al-Arabiya Newspaper, Issue 88, December 1927, p. 2.
- 12) A letter from Shakib Arslan to Rashid Rida, Ahmed Al-Sharbasi, Shakib Arslan, his life and literature, Master's thesis, Institute of Arab Studies, Cairo, 1962, Appendix 85.
- 13) Directorate of Historical Documents, Damascus, No. 9/493, Private Papers, Document 7, Letter from Not Certainly Arslan to Dr. Ahmad Qadri, June 10, 1932.
- 14) Muhammad al-Mili, Ibn Badis and the Arabism of Algeria, Dar al-Thaqafa, Beirut, 1973, p. 230.
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- 19) Previous source, p. 114.
- 20) Shakib Arslan, The Arab League Has No Entrance to the Railways or Oil Pipelines, Arab League Newspaper, Issue 571, Jerusalem, April 19, 1931, National Library and Archives, Hashemite Royal Court Files, Baghdad, File, 730/311 Book of the Iraqi Consulate in Beirut No. 152, 1931.
- 21) Letter from Shakib Arslan to Ahmad Qadri, June 10, 1932, Ali Abdul Wahid Al-Sanea, Diplomatic Representation of Iraq with Neighboring Countries, p. 293.

- 22) The intended here is Prince Ali bin Al Hussein, who was aspiring to the throne of Syria.
- 23) A letter from Shakib Arslan to Rashid Rida, 17 Rabi' al-Thani 1350 AH, Ahmad al-Sharbasi, Shakib Arslan, his life and literature, Appendix 74-75.
- 24) Letter to Abdul Salam Binuna Najib Al-Ba'ini, from the Emir of Eloquence, p. 249, Directorate of Historical Documents, Damascus, Document No. 3/67, Special Section, Nabih Al-Azma Collection, p. 67.
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