Though the present world power is characterized as a multipolar, the exact flavour and practice are neither well understood nor consistently observed. Moreover, in the absence of a genuine balance of power in a multipolar order, human rights are often compromised, as powerful states prioritize self-interest over universal values. This has a result to frequent violations of human rights. However, formal organizations created by agreements among sovereign states to address shared challenges and purse common goals on a global scale human right. This study addresses a significant gap in the existing literature by exploring how these institutions operate within a multipolar global framework, where competing national interests, unequal power relations, and varying cultural perspectives often outweigh normative commitments to human rights. Prior studies have primarily concentrated on institutional performance within a Western centric liberal order, leaving a gap in understanding their effectiveness and adaptability in a fragmented geopolitical landscape. The main aim of this research is to assess whether international institutions can continue to act as effective defenders of human rights in light of global power diffusion, and to what extend they have succeeded or failed in this role. Employing a doctrinal approach grounded in secondary data, this research explores institutional behaviour through case studies including Yemen, Myanmar, Bangladesh and others, revealing a pattern of both stagnation and potential. Findings show that institutional efforts are frequently obstructed by political deadlocks, such as the veto power held by the UN Security Council and the selective engagement of states with entities such as the International Criminal Court. This study also uncovers new opportunities, including the concept of an “Accountability Economy,” in which nations enhance their human rights standards not just out of duty but to gain economic advantages and improve their international reputation. The research emphasizes how trade incentives, reputation-related pressures, and regional interpretations of human rights can provide alternative methods to encourage adherence.